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Abstract 
Corporate Governance is a concept emerging from the agency theory, as to synchronize between the owner and 
management’s interests. The achievement of corporate performance relies on the mechanism efficiency of 
Corporate Governance both internally and externally. This study is intended to show the influence of Corporate 
Governance towards the corporate performance, particularly the profitability and the corporate’s dividend policy. 
The study was conducted to all non-financial corporations in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2007 – 2010. 
The result of the study shows that the external corporate governance which was measured through the existence 
of institutional ownership and debt holder has a higher effectiveness than internal corporate governance which 
was measured by the independent commissioner’s ratio towards the corporate performance. 
Keywords: corporate governance, dividend policy, profitability  
 
1. Background and goals of the study 
In an organization, especially a public corporation, functional specialization is required in order to achieve more 
efficient goals. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means (1932) state that in an 
organization there should be a separation between the corporate owners and managers, which result in 
consequences regarding the organizational sociology and economy. 
Based on the agency theory introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) it is shown that the separation of 
ownership and control will result in the agency relationship when the principal deputes their authority towards 
the agent to execute some services of the principals that are conceptualized in a series of contracts. Such 
separation can lead towards conflicts as a result of the conflict of interests which generally occur in almost all 
individual activities in the principal – agency hierarchy.  
The agency conflicts can be alleviated with contracts, although not all aspects can be stated in such contracts. 
Thus, corporate governance is needed to help the corporate synchronizes the interests of all members of the 
organization (Hart, 1995). Corporate governance is a law system, rules and factors that control the corporate 
operations (Gillan, 2006). 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into the internal and external mechanisms (Gillan, 2006; 
Rezaee, 2007). The internal mechanism is derived from the board of commissioners, internal control, and 
internal audit functions. The quality of the internal mechanism is closely related to a better corporate 
performance (Aman dan Nguyen,2008). Whereas the external mechanism is derived from the capital market, 
corporate control market, labor market, state status, court decisions, stock holders, and investor activities. 
The balance and effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism can create a better corporate financial 
performance. Dividend, as one of the financial performance measurements is one of the financial management 
policy to achieve corporate objectives. Dividend policy is related to a corporate option to pay to the stake holders, 
the amount of the payout and its time frequency (Meggison, 1997). The right decision regarding the dividend is 
sometimes a hard choice due to the need towards balancing the power of those who potentially can create 
conflicts.   
Factors that determine the dividend payout remain the researches’ focus nowadays. The earning factor becomes 
a consideration in the dividend payout (Lintner,1956; Baker and Powell,1999; Kumar,2006). The dividend 
policy is an interaction of the corporate investment decisions as viewed by Rozeff (1982). In their analysis, 
Frankfurther and Wood (2002) mention that there are no rational economic reasons that can explain the dividend 
phenomenon. Black (1996) states that dividend is a dividend puzzle, a paradox that cannot explain the reasons 
why corporations pay the dividend. However, dividend still becomes an important consideration for the investors 
when making decisions on investment Chiang et al. (2006), Allen et al. (2000), Guo and Ni (2008). 
This study is to analyze the roles of the corporate governance mechanisms both internally and externally that 
influence the corporate finance performance in non finance corporations in Indonesia. In this study, the external 
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mechanism is measured by the existence of the institutional ownership and by the existence of the debt holders, 
especially in the banking institutions. The previous study shows a contradictory result about the relationship 
between the corporate governance and the financial performance. Han et al. (1999), Allen et al. (2000), Rubin 
and Smith (2009), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) who analyzed the influence of corporate governance especially 
through the institutional ownership show a positive correlation between the dividend policy and the institutional 
investors. On the other side, Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Harada and Nguyen (2006), who conducted their 
research in Japan found that corporate governance through the ownership concentration has a negative 
correlation with the dividend policy. The result of this study reveals that external corporate governance is more 
effective and thus has a greater influence than internal corporate governance. 
2. Corporate Governance 
In order to define the corporate objectives, corporate governance takes an important roles to enable the manager 
to manage the corporations and create a good management strategy. According to Hart (1995), the corporate 
governance issue has been rising due to two conditions: the agency problems as a result of the conflicts of 
interests among the members in the organization and the cost of transactions due to the fact that agency problems 
cannot be settled by contracts.  
Rezaee (2007) states that corporate governance is traditionally viewed as a mechanism to synchronize both the 
management and the stockholders’ interests. More specifically, the role of the corporate governance is to reduce 
the agency cost and to create a long term value for the stockholders with the focus on both the board of directors’ 
monitoring responsibility and the senior executives’ managerial functions. 
Researchers often categorize corporate governance mechanisms into two categories, i.e. internal and external 
corporate mechanisms. The internal mechanism is divided into five basic categories, they are: the board of 
commissioners (roles, structures and incentives), managerial incentives, capital structure, constitutions and 
corporate regulations, and internal control system. Whereas external mechanism is divided into five categories, 
they are: law and regulations, market, capital market information and analysis, accounting market, finance and 
law, and special sources of external control (Gillan, 2006). 
 
2.1 Independent Commissioners as internal corporate governance 
Gillian (2006) explains that the mechanism of internal corporate governance exists in a corporation, and comes 
from two parties, they are the board of commissioners as the highest point that conducts the internal controlling 
system and the management that acts as the corporate agency. 
One internal mechanism that can reduce the agency problems is the existence of the independent board of 
commissioners that can represent the stockholders’ interest with the main responsibility to approve the important 
managerial decisions, including the ones involving the investment policy, management compensation policy and 
the board governance itself, as well as to monitor the implementation of the decisions that have been taken (Byrd 
et al.,1998; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
In the Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance (2006), it is stated that the independent commissioners 
are the board of commissioners’ members who are not affiliated with the directors, the other members of the 
board of commissioners and the controlling stockholders, and they have neither business nor  family correlations 
with the controlling stockholders, other members of both the board of directors and board of commissioners as 
well as with the corporation itself, which may influence their independency and their authority to act solely for 
the corporation. Therefore, one of the missions of the independent commissioners is to promote the 
implementation of Good Corporate Governance in corporations in Indonesia. 
In this study the internal corporate governance is measured by the proportion of the independent commissioners 
from the total members of the corporation’s board of commissioners (David et al.,1998; Tihanyi et al.,2003; 
Aman and Nguyen,2008; Chi and Lee, 2010). 
 
2.2. Institutional ownership as external corporate governance 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) ownership structure is viewed from the agency problem due to the 
separation of the ownership and control. Ownership structure is not only connected with the agency cost, in this 
case debts and equity, but also the crucial factor, that is, the equity distribution that refers to votes and capitals, 
and the identity of equity ownership.  
Ownership structure is systematically varied in some ways. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) mention that there are 
some general power that may influence the ownership structure, they are: the size of the corporation, control 
potential, regulating systems, potential comfort from corporate outcomes.  
Investors are commonly divided into two types: the individual and the institutional investors. Institutional 
ownership has very important roles in the corporate governance, especially in relation to its ability for 
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monitoring, gaining information and its impacts towards both corporate policies and performance. Some 
empirical studies that have been conducted in relation to the monitoring ability of institutional ownership are 
Cornett et al. (2007), Guo and Ni (2008), Elyasiani and Jia (2010) who have pointed out that institutional 
investors may differ form individuals in terms of the stock quantity and their expertise in gaining information 
and managerial monitoring. The role of the institutional ownership in influencing the strategic corporate policies 
is analyzed by Denis et al. (1999), Tihanyi et al. (2003) who state that corporate strategic decision diversification 
is the representation of the corporate decisions where conflicts of interests between the managers and 
stockholders lie.  
The definition of institutional investors in this study refers to David et al. (1998), who mention that institutional 
ownership is the stock ownership by an organization or institution, not the individual ownership. In this study, 
the institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of the institutional ownership and institutional 
ownership consistency. According to Chen et al, (2008) there are three benefits in a massive ownership, i.e. they 
are correlated with the higher proportion of the economical profit due to cost effectiveness, cost reduction in 
coordinating the management, and big institutions will find more difficulties and more expensiveness when it try 
to sell its big quantity of shares.  
Ownership consistency shows the ownership stability and the length of investment for an investor. Bushee (1998) 
mentions that a consistent ownership enables the owner to do the monitoring and to regulate the managers to 
maximize long term values than short term benefits. Elyasiani and Jia (2010) state that the ownership time span 
is an important factor in determining the institutional roles. Institutional investors have different investment time 
span in their portfolio. Investors with longer term of investment show that the ownership stability has more 
opportunities to examine the corporation as a motivation towards a more effective monitoring, which can reduce 
asymmetric information and to decrease pressure to the managers, to alter the executive compensation and to 
adjust with both the management and stockholders’ interests.  
 
2.3 The Debt holder as an external corporate governance 
Debt holders are the external party who gives loans to corporations and can also function as the corporate 
governance mechanism. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that loans cause a bonding mechanism for the 
managers to bring good outcomes for the stockholders, by not creating an opportunity to deviate from the 
corporations’ free cash flow. The bigger the loans, the more cash the corporations will have to pay for the 
interest and installment. Loan taking by the managers will cause risks to the corporations if the managers fail to 
show an effective performance. Thus, the use of loan can change the management’s monitoring from the 
stockholders to the creditors.  
According to Jensen (2000), the use of loans as a financial source should go along with the debt covenant as a 
payout requirement to stimulate the managers’ discipline and to limit activities that may destroy the recovery of 
the loan. John and Senbet (1998) say that a debt contract will make the managers work as being part of the 
owners by making investment decisions and optimal financing, in order to maximize the corporate value for the 
owners. 
In this study, debt holders will be measured by the debt holder concentration, especially from a banking 
institution. The existence of debt holders, especially from the banking institution has a specific role, as a 
delegated monitor for the depositors. Such an institution collects money from the investors, lend and monitor the 
agent as a part of itself. Debt holders’ monitoring and screening activities will give both positive and negative 
outcomes for the external party, for the other creditors and stockholders (Triantis and  Daniels(1995).  
 
3. Corporate Financial Performance 
One of the measurements to judge the corporate financial performance is the dividend, that is, the payout that 
each stockholder receives. Megginson (1977) mentions that the dividend policy decision is a corporate option to 
pay to the stockholders their payouts as a dividend and to decide the amount to be paid as well as the frequency 
of it. In order to set a dividend policy, the management will refer to the scheme on the size and the pattern of 
cash distribution to the stockholders through a period of time (Baker, 2009). The precise decision on the 
dividend scheme is sometimes a difficult choice because of the needs to balance the many forces potential to 
conflicts. The management needs to consider a trade off, that is, if a corporation pays dividend to the 
stockholders, it might reflects the good state of the corporation, while in fact, it reduces other investments.  On 
the other hand, if a corporation reduces the dividend, the company’s growth is increasing, however, in a glance it 
looks as if it decreases the stockholders’ prosperity. According to Baker and Powell (1999) this conflict happens 
because of investments, funding and dividend decisions which are related to each other.  
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The factors that determines the dividend paid by the corporation is a problem that sometimes attracts   attention 
from the corporations and the researchers. Lintner (1956) is a researcher who conducts a classical study on how 
the US managers make the decisions about the dividend. Lintner’s results of the study concludes that current net 
earning is the main factor which is generally used as a base for the dividend changes decision, because net 
earning is always reported periodically and is published in the financial reports. Frankfurther and Wood (2002), 
Truong and Heaney (2007) are the researchers who support earning as the base for the dividend scheme. In this 
study corporate performance will be measured by the dividend policy, that is, the dividen payout ratio and 
profitability (return on equity). 
 
4. Research Methods 
The research objects in this study are all non-financial corporations, which have paid dividend in 2007 – 2010. 
The used financial date is based on both the annual and quarter data gained from www.idx.co.id and from the 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory. The data was taken by means of pooled data under purposive sampling 
techniques. 128 corporate annual data units were derived using the mentioned criteria. 
The internal corporate governance mechanisms is measured by the use of the independent commissioner’s proxy 
ratio, a proportional number of the independent commissioners from the total number of the board of 
commissioners. The external corporate governance mechanisms is measured by the use of two proxy: 
institutional ownership consistency and institutional ownership consistency. The earlier is measured by the use 
of a measurement proposed by Elyasiani and Jia (2010), i.e. institutional ownership persistence (IOP) from the 
average ratio of proportional ownership divided by the standard deviation of proportional ownership during the 
period of analysis. 
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t= analysis time, p=institutional investor proportion in a corporation i by investor j at the time t,  Std=standard 
deviation p during analysis period, J=number of institutional investors in corporation t. 
The institutional ownership concentration is summed up from the percentage of the five biggest institutional 
ownerships. Profitability, as a mediation variable, is measured by the means of the dividend payout ratio 
(Dividend/EAT). Data analysis is measured by the use of path analysis approach with the completion of AMOS 
16.0 program. 
 
5. Results and Discussions 
Based on the descriptive analysis in Table 1, it is stated that there are non financial corporations that pay the 
dividend  although they have lost (DPR -0.0223, ROE -0.1674) and there are also corporations that pay dividend 
that is more than the the profit they gain in that year (DPR 1.3633). Such a condition shows that those 
corporations will use their internal funds to pay for the dividend. 
The Independend Commissioners average (RKI) owned by the corporations is 0.3696, which means that the 
average corporations have the number of independent commissioners in accordance with the rules, that is, 
minimum 30% of the total number of the commissioners. 
Although the corporations’ debt holder power (IHU) has varied values from close to 0 up to 1, the debt holder 
concentration average is 0.4073. This condition shows that corporations tend to avoid borrowing a long term 
fund from a particular bank and will in turn divide the loans to some banks as to reduce the pressure of debt 
covenants.  
The ownership consistency values (IOP) shows the variations of huge consistency among the sampled 
corporations. This condition shows that there is an institutional ownership which is very consistent in defending 
its ownership in the same number and for a long time , however, on the other hand, it also tends to be very 
inconsistent by changing the ownership.  
The Institutional ownership concentration (IOC) shows that the institutional ownership average is concentrated 
in a quite a high value of 0.653, it even has the maximim value of 0.997. This shows that stock ownership in 
Indonesia tends to be owned by institutions in great number and only a few are owned by individuals/comunity.  
Prior to a further test, with the use of path analysis testing approach – which generally uses Maximum 
Likelihood estimation – an assumption is tested: data normality and non existence of the outliers data as well as 
its multicollinearity (Ghozali, 2008). Evaluation of the Data Normality, the testing result shows that the value of 
CR for multivariate is 5.323, although this figure is above the critical value, i.e. +2.58.  However, Klein (2005) 
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figures out that the data will cause problems when the CR value is more than 10. Thus, this can be categorized as 
a normal data. The Outliers evaluation, shows that the maximum Mahalanobis value is 19.298. This figure is 
smaller than the chi square value (χ2) (6;0.001)=22.46. This shows that there are no multivariate outliers. The 
multicollinearity evaluation, as taken from its sample correlation matrix, shows that there is no single variable 
tested that has a value of more than 0.90, so the multicollinearity among variables does not occur.   
The goodness of fit test to measure whether the observatory input fits the proposed model prediction will be 
conducted after the assumption testing fulfills the requirements. Two measurements, i.e. absolute fit measure and 
incremental fit measure are used to conduct the test. Based on Table 2, the models have chi square, probability, 
GFI, NFI, AGFI and TLI values according to the fit requirements have a proper goodness of fit, so that the 
hypothesis testing can be conducted.  
The hypothesis testing through path analysis show three significant hypothesis results (Table 3). The institutional 
ownership concentration (KKI) has significant positive impacts towards both profitability and corporate dividend. 
The significant results in this hypothesis support the agency theory concepts that the interaction between the 
institutional ownership and financial performance is part of the agency theory mechanism to reduce the agency 
conflicts (Megginson,1997; Byrd et al.,1998). The existence of the institutional ownership in large amount is 
assumed to have the monitoring capability, the ability to influence the management, so that the owners’ interests 
and the management’s will align (alignment theory); and therefore it will lead to a better organizational 
performance. This testing result is in accordance with Cornett et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2008), Elyasiani and Jia 
(2010). The concentration of ownership can also give impact to the management so as not to perform non-
profitable activities, such as over-investment and unprofitable investment. In this case, the dividend payment is 
an option to reduce free cash flow that can be used by the management. Besides, the larger number of votes of 
the institutions will be more effective for fighting for better dividend payout  (Truong and Heaney, 2009;  Rubin 
and Smith, 2009). 
The consistency in ownership (IOP) has no significant influence in both corporate performance i.e. ROE and 
DPR. This insignificant result is estimated that the actual ownership consistency shows the investment purposes 
of the investors. The consistent and stable institutional ownership tend to have long term goals, which prefers to 
choose monitoring which offers information advantages. To get long term benefits, the investors will delay the 
dividend acceptance and support more the corporate investment activities (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005; 
Kumar, 2006). 
The existence of the debt holder through its concentration does not have a significant positive influence towards 
profitability (ROE), towards a negative coefficient. The insignificant results and the direction towards  the 
negative coefficient show that debt holders as an institution that gives loans has a number of mechanisms, 
especially through debt covenants. Debt covenants can prevent the debt holders from bankruptcy and can give 
the rules of preference to the managers to act more carefully and to stimulate improvements in managerial 
activities. For the corporations, although loans can help them to conduct their activities, however, the risks and 
responsibilities will influence both the corporate performance and outcomes. This makes them tend to use 
internal funds and lessen the concentration of debt holders by asking for loans to some banks. This hypothesis 
result does not go along with Triantis and Daniels (1995) who mention that the existence of the debt holders with 
their debt convenants will be able to increase the borrowers’ value through improvements on the managerial 
slack. 
The debt holders’ concentration has a significant negative influence with the dividend policy (DPR) on the p 
value of 0.084. This empirical study is in accordance with the agency theory which shows the existence of 
conflicts between the debt holders and stockholders. The dividend payout by the stockholders will lessen the 
corporation’s free cash flow. but, this will also decrease the availability of cash for the debt holders to pay   
installments and interest, and vice versa.  
In order to synchronize the interests of both the debt holders and corporations, a debt contract or covenant needs 
to be made. The more concentrated the debt holders power, by a means of a contract, the debt holders will make 
an agreement, in its effort to guard his/her rights from the possibility of lost and of corporation’s policy one of 
which is related to the dividend payout. The above argumentation supports the statement which mentions that the 
debt holder’s concentration as an external corporate governance mechanism can use their power to do controlling  
the corporation, i.e. controlling the use of cash flow. The results of this study goes along with the research 
conducted by Brockman and Unli (2009) who mention that the creditors’ rights will influence the corporate 
decisions, because the creditors will apply competitive rules with debt holders and stockholders’ interests. 
Creditors’ rights alleviation will cause reduction on the numbers of dividends.   
The existence of the independent commissioners (RKI) does not have a significant influence towards the 
corporate performance which is measured through profitability (ROE) as well as the dividend policy (DPR). The 
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insignificant result shows that internal corporate governance, especially the existence of the independent 
commissioners does not support the agency theory because of its ineffectiveness in doing the controlling. Such a 
condition is assumed to be caused by the fact that the nature of the commissioners’ independency in Indonesia 
tends to be contradictory to the requirements for the board of independent commissioners’ members. It is 
assumed that the independent commissioners are not really independent towards the corporations, or, this has 
become a way for the corporations to introduce the term independency, or they might be the CEOs for the other 
corporations so that they have limited time and focus. Such an argumentation is in accordance with the one 
stated by Abdel Salam et al. (2008), Chi and Lee (2010); Yammeesri and Herath (2010) which say that the 
existence of the independent commissioners is not important in improving the corporate performance.   
The corporate profitability (ROE) does not influence the dividend policy and has a negative coefficient. Such an 
insignificant result is against the net earning approach by Lintner (1956), which means that the dividend payout 
policy is not determined by the earning only. The existence of other corporate policies to utilize profitability for 
other purposes, such as for corporate investments, Rozeff (1982) states that when the growth of corporation’s 
yield is high, they will decide a low dividend payout because it will be used for the corporate investments. The 
insignificant result might be because of the world phenomenon about the tendency of corporations for not paying 
the dividend and pay it with a decreasing margin payout in spite of corporations’ good profit (Denis and 
Osobov,2008). Whereas Al Twaijry (2007) states that profitability does not correlate with the payout ratio, 
because the dividend policy is determined more by the dividend patterns in the past, at present and future 
estimation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Studies show that the external corporate governance, especially the concentration of institutional ownership and 
debt holders are more effective in influencing the corporate financial performance than internal corporate 
governance. Institutional ownership and debt holders have better capabilities in doing monitoring, giving 
influence, pressure and a better understanding of the information. The internal corporate governance’s is not 
showing a significant influence towards corporate performance which means that the independent 
commissioners are not really independent, so that they cannot act to synchronize the principal and management’s 
interests. However, to create a  good corporate governance, it is necessary to have a balance between both the 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
References 
Abdelsalam O, El Masry A, Elsegini S. (2008).  “Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Dividend 
Policies in An Emerging Market, Further evidence from CASE 50.” Managerial Finance Vol. 34, No.12, 953-
964 
Allen F, Bernardo A, Welch I. (2000). “A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clineteles”, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. LV, No. 6, Dec, 2499 - 2536 
Al-Twaijry A.A. (2007). “ Dividend Policy and Payout Ratio: Evidence from The Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange”, The Journal of Risk Finance Vol. 8, No.4, 349 - 263 
Aman H, Nguyen P. (2008). “ Do stock prices reflect the corporate governance quality of Japanese firm”, 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, Vol. 22, 647-662 
Baker K, Powell G. (1999). “How Corporate Managers View Dividend Policy”, Quarterly of Business and 
Economics, Spring, Vol. 38, No. 2, 17-35 
Baker,H.K. (2009).  “Dividends and Dividend Policy”, The Robert W.Kolb Series in Finance,  John Willey 
&Sons,Inc 
Berle A, Means G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. MacMillan, New York 
Black F. (1996). “ The Dividend Puzzle”, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter, December, Special 
issue, 8-12 
Bhagat S, Bolton B. (2008). “ Corporate Governance and Firm Performance”, Journal of Corporate   Finance, 
14, 257-273 
Brockman P, Unli E.(2009). “ Dividend Policy, Creditor Rights and The Agency Costs of Debt”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 92, 276-299 
Bushee B. (1998). “ The Influence of Institutional Investor on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior”, The 
Accounting Review, Vol.73, No. 3, 305-333  
Byrd J, Parrino R, Pritsch G. (1998). “ Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value”, Financial Analyst 
Journal, May/June, Vol. 54, 14-30 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.4, 2013 
 
138 
Chen J, Blenman L, Chen Hsin. (2008). “ Does Institutional Ownership Create Value? The New Zealand Case”, 
Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting, Vol 47, No.4  
Chiang K, Frankfurter G, Kosedag A, Wood B. (2006). "The Perception of Dividends by Professional Investors", 
Managerial Finance, Vol. 32 Iss: 1, 60 – 81 
Cornett M.M, Marcus A, Saunders A, Tehranian H. (2007). “ The Impact of Institutional Ownership on 
Corporate Operating Performance”, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 31, 2632-2647 
David P, Kochhar R, Levitas E. (1998). “The Effect of Institutional Investor on The Level and Mix of CEO 
Compensation”, Academy of Management Journal Vol.41 No.2, 200-208 
Demsetz H, Lehn K. (1985). “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”,  Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol 93, No.6, 1155-1177 
Denis, D. J., D. K. Denis, and A. Sarin. (1999).  “Agency Theory and The Influence of Equity Ownership 
Structure on Corporate Diversification Strategies”, Strategic Management Journal Vol. 20, 1071-1976 
Denis D.J, Osobov I. (2008). “ Why Do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on The Determinants of 
Dividend Policy”, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 89, 62-82 
Elyasiani E, Jia J. (2010). “ Distribution of Institutional Ownership and Corporate Firm Performance”,  Journal 
of Banking & Finance Vol.34, Isue 3, March, 606-620 
Frankfurther G, Wood B. (2002). “ Dividend policy theories and their empirical tests”, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, Vol.11, 111-138 
Ghozali,I. (2008).  Model Persamaan Structural, Konsep & Aplikasi dengan Program AMOS 16.0.     Badan 
Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang 
Gillan S. (2006). “ Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An overview”,  Journal of Corporate 
Finance , Vol. 12, 381-402 
Grinstein Y, Michaely R. (2005). “ Institutional Holdinggs and Payout Policy”, The Journal of Finance Vol. 60, 
No. 3, 1389-1426 
Guo W, Ni J. (2008). “ Institutional Ownership and Firm’s Dividend Policy”, Corporate Ownership & Control, 
Vol. 5, issue 2, Winter,128-136 
Han,K,Lee SH, Suk DY.  (1999).  “ Institutional Shareholders and Dividends”, Journal of Financial and 
Strategic Decision, Vol. 12 Number 1 Spring, 53-62 
Harada K, Nguyen P.  (2006 )“ Ownership concentration, agency conflicts and dividend policy in Japan”,  
Desember, SSRN 
Hart, O. (1995). “ Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, 
Issue 430, May, 678-689 
National Committee of Governance (2006), Indonesia’s Code of Good Corporate Governance (Online) Available: 
http:// www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/indonesia_cg_2006_en.pdf 
Jensen M, Meckling W. (1976). “ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics,  Vol. 3 No 4,305-360 
Jensen M. (2000). “A Theory Of The Firm. Governance, Residual Claims and organizational Forms”. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London 
John K, Senbet L. (1998). “Corporate Governance  and Board Effectiveness” Journal of Banking and Finance, 
Vol. 22,371-403 
Kline, R. (2005). “Principles and Practise of Structural Equation Modelling”, Second Edition, The Guilford 
Press, New York, London 
Kumar,J . (2006). “ Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout in India” , Journal of Emerging Market Finance 
Vol. 5,No. 1, 15-58 
Lintner J. (1956). “ Distribution of Income of Corporations Among Dividens, Retained earnings and Taxes”, The 
American Economic Review Vol 46 No 2,97-113, Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association May 
1956. 
Megginson W. (1997). Corporate Finance Theory, Addison Weley Educational Publisher,Inc 
National Committee on Governance. (2006). Indonesia’s Code Of Good Corporate Governance, 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/indonesia_cg_2006_en.pdf.   
Renneboog L, Trojanowski G. (2005). “Control Structures and Payout Policy”, European Corporate 
Governance Institute, Discussion Paper, N0. 61, April, Tilburg University, ISSN 0924-7815 
Rezaee Z. (2007). Corporate Governance post-Sarbanes Oxley: regulations, requirements and integrated 
processes, John Willey &Sons, Inc 
Rozeff M.  (1982). “ How Corporations Set Their Dividen Payout Ratios”, The Journal of financial research 
Vol. V, No. 3, 249-259 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.4, 2013 
 
139 
Rubin,A, Smith Daniel. (2009). “ Institutional Ownership, Volatility and Dividend”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance Vol. 33, 627 – 639 
Tihanyi L, Johnson R, Hoskisson R, Hitt M. (2003). “ Institutional Ownership Differences and International 
Diversification; The Effects of Boards of Director and Technological Opportunity”, Academy of Management 
Journal  Vol. 46, No.2 195-211 
Triantis G, Daniels R. (1995). “The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance”, University of California 
Review, Vol. 83, 1073-1113 
Truong T, Heaney R. (2007). “ Largest Shareholder and Dividend Policy”, The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, Vol. 47, 667-687 
Yammeesri J, Herath SK. (2010). “ Board Characteristics and Corporate Value: Evidence from Thailand” , 
Corporate Governance,Vol.10, No.3, 279-992  
 
Notes: 
Table 1.Descriptive Statistics 
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DPR 128 -0,0223 1,3633 0,3018 0,2567 
ROE 128 -0,1674 0,6247 0,1680 0,1116 
RKI 128 0,1429 0,6667 0,3696 0,0775 
IHU 128 0,0000 1,0000 0,4073 0,4015 
IOP 128 0,1567 90,00E15 60,928E14 20,1168E15 
KKI 128 0,1232 0,9977 0,6533 0,1996 
 
Table 2. Goodness of Fit Test Full Model 
Goodness of Fit Index Cut off value Result Evaluation 
Chi-square (df=2) < 5,991 0,417 Good 
Probability ≥ 0,05 0,812 Good 
GFI ≥ 0,90 0,999 Good 
NFI ≥ 0,90 0,991 Good 
AGFI ≥ 0,90 0,989 Good 
TLI ≥ 0,90 1,359 Good 
 
Table 3. Estimation Regression 
   
Stand. 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ROE <--- KKI 0,214 0,050 2,398 0,016 
ROE <--- IOP 0,137 0,002 1,555 0,120 
ROE <--- IHU -0,028 0,026 -0,308 0,758 
ROE <--- RKI 0,084 0,127 0,953 0,341 
DPR <--- IOP 0,036 0,004 0,412 0,680 
DPR <--- IHU -0,156 0,058 -1,728 0,084 
DPR <--- ROE -0,217 0,199 -2,510 0,012 
DPR <--- KKI 0,233 0,114 2,624 0,009 
DPR <--- RKI 0,075 0,285 0,872 0,383 
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